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The case is made  that the EU-Turkey CU of 1995 covering industrial goods should be 
modernised and modified to take into account the various and growing criticisms of 
the original CU. Furthermore, economic integration between the EU and Turkey 
should be strengthened by signing a complementary deep integration regional trade 
agreement (RTA) between the EU and Turkey, covering agriculture, SPS measures, 
services, government procurement, investment, and dispute settlement. For Turkey, 
the objective would be to achieve comprehensive liberalisation, while for the EU this 
is an ideal opportunity to harness the economic and political potential of deeper 
integration with Turkey, in line with its wider trade and investment policy. 
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Doubts about the desirability or feasibility of the full accession of Turkey to the EU in the short run have 
increased substantially in recent years, due to both the internal direction of the Turkish government and 
the economic and security challenges facing the broader EU. Yet despite recent trends, there is little 
reason for either Turkey or the EU and its Member States to unilaterally break with Turkey’s accession 
process. In fact, as this paper will show, the various interdependencies of the two partners, as well as the 
high potentials of their partnership in terms of politics and security, economy, trade and energy, can offer 
economic benefits for both sides and help to overcome the issues currently seen in their relationship.  
Nevertheless, the current framework of interaction between the two countries is over twenty years old; 
the EU-Turkey customs union (CU) was agreed upon in 1995 and is becoming increasingly out-dated. 
Both the EU and Turkey are aware that the pre-internet age EU-Turkey CU no longer meets the 
requirements of 21st century for trade relations. Consequently, the Turkish government is interested in 
up-dating the EU-Turkey trade and investment relations, but it is not sure how this updating should take 
place. Under these circumstances, the solution for confronting mutual economic challenges may not only 
be a substantial re-think of the existing CU but a move towards greater economic integration. 
This paper assesses the case for modernising EU-Turkey trade and investment relations. It offers the point 
of view that any updating of the CU should seek to deepen economic ties between the EU and Turkey. 
The sum of our analysis is that the EU-Turkey CU of 1995 should be modernised and modified to take into 
account the various and growing criticisms of the CU. Furthermore, economic integration between the 
EU and Turkey should be strengthened by signing a complementary deep-integration regional trade 
agreement (RTA) between the EU and Turkey covering agriculture, SPS measures, services, government 
procurement, investment, and dispute settlement.  
Such an approach should increase competition and lead to better allocation of resources in both Turkey 
and the EU, as well as other benefits for both partners. From the point of view of Turkey, signing a deep 
integration regional trade agreement (RTA) with the EU should increase market access for agricultural 
commodities in the EU market through the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers while increasing 
market access in services and public procurement markets by aligning the regulatory framework 
between the parties in services and public procurement. Turkey is realising the importance of global 
value chains trade, and the advantages of concluding a deep and comprehensive FTA covering 
agriculture, SPS measures, services, government procurement, and investment and dispute settlement 
chapters will be economically significant.  
Gains are possible from the EU side as well. Deepening the EU-Turkey integration would help to 
strengthen the global role of the EU, and lead to improved market access for EU firms in Turkish 
agricultural commodities and services markets. It would also provide enhanced access for EU firms to 
Turkish government procurement market. An expanded RTA should additionally cover the liberalisation 
of investment, both in most of the services and non-service sectors, including performance requirements 
to ensure environmental, social and labour standards are met. Through such a modernisation, the RTA 
will be able to create substantial new trade opportunities for EU firms in goods and services as well as in 
increasing sustainable investment.  
Moreover, such a move would bring EU-Turkey trade and investment relations into line with current EU 
RTAs, such as the KOREU, EU-Canada CETA, and the emerging Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP), which contain much stronger provisions than the EU-Turkey CU. The TTIP negotiations 
actually offer much instruction for the blue print of liberalisation of trade between the EU and Turkey, 
with its mix of a harmonisation approach in some areas and mutual recognition or mutual equivalence in 
others; such a mix may make it easier for Turkey to fulfil the requirements of any expanded RTA.  
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The following section examines the structure of the CU and 
what it has meant for both Turkey and the EU, while the Section 2 performs an assessment of the EU-
Turkey CU from the point of view of both parties. Section 3 considers the wider context of recent 
developments in the world economy, before focusing on the question of how to update EU-Turkey trade 
and investment relations to identify the various options facing Turkey and the EU. Finally, the Section 4 
concludes with some recommendations related to this analysis.  
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1 The European Union-Turkey customs union 
In order to understand the future of any new or expanded trade and investment agreement between the 
EU and Turkey, it is instructive to identify how the previous agreement has affected the partners. This 
section identifies the legal framework governing the EU – Turkey Customs Union and assesses how it has 
functioned to structure trade relations between the two parties. It then focuses on regulatory and 
behind-the-border policies before turning to the quantitative impact that can be attributed to the 
Customs Union. 
1.1 The framework regulating EU-Turkey trade and investment relations 
Turkey first applied for associate membership of the then-European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959. 
The application resulted in an Association Agreement (the Ankara Agreement) between the EEC and 
Turkey in 1963, whereby the parties agreed to create, inter alia, a Customs Union (CU). In 1970, an 
Additional Protocol was signed, setting out a timetable for abolishing tariffs and quotas on goods 
circulating between the parties. The CU was established on January 1, 1996 through the European Union 
(EU) -Turkey Association Council Decision 1/95, covering industrial goods including industrial component 
of processed agricultural commodities but excluding European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
products. A free trade agreement (FTA) between the ECSC and Turkey was signed on February 29, 1996, 
with European Commission Decision 96/528/ECSC covering the ECSC products. 
The EU-Turkey CU Decision 1/95 of 1995 required Turkey to eliminate all customs duties, quantitative 
restrictions, charges with an equivalent effect to customs duties, and all measures with an equivalent 
effect to quantitative restrictions in the trade of industrial goods with the EU as of January 1, 1996. In 
addition, Turkey was required to adopt the EU’s Common External Tariffs (CET) on third-country imports 
and adopt all the preferential agreements the EU had/has concluded and would/will conclude with third 
countries. Consequently, this has meant that Turkey has also concluded FTAs with Israel, Macedonia, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Palestine, Tunisia, Morocco, Syria, Egypt, Albania, Georgia, Montenegro, Serbia, 
Chile, Jordan, Mauritius, South Korea, and Malaysia over the past twenty years, in tandem with the EU.1 
Alongside this economic integration in industrial goods under the customs union, the EU and Turkey 
have had a separate process related to Turkey’s accession to the EU. This two-track approach has created 
a complex relationship between the two parties. This was highlighted in 2004 when the European 
Council opened the accession negotiations with Turkey by emphasising that the: 
[N]egotiations are an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed 
beforehand’ but that ‘while having full regard to all Copenhagen criteria, including the 
absorption capacity of the Union, if Turkey is not in a position to assume in full all the obligations 
of membership it must be ensured that Turkey is fully anchored in the European structures 
through the strongest possible bond. 
As a result of the open-ended nature of the Accession process, an unprecedented situation has emerged 
whereby on the one hand, Turkey’s integration process with EU regulatory regimes, as initiated under the 
Ankara Agreement, has moved far beyond other EU trade partners’ regulatory obligations. On the other 
hand however, as Section 3.1 discusses further, third parties that are not in accession to the EU, have 
secured market access commitments from the EU in the areas of services, investment, public 
procurement, geographical indicators and agriculture that extend far beyond those provided by the legal 
framework of the EU-Turkey CU. When compared to the state of the art agreements signed between the 
 
1 In 1991, Turkey signed a FTA with European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries. The FTA between Turkey and Syria was 
suspended on December 6, 2011.  
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EU and Canada, for example, or the emerging mega-regionals such as Trans-Atlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP), the shallow and narrow nature of the EU-Turkey agreement is all too 
apparent. 
1.1.1 The scope of the EU – Turkey CU 
The CU immediately appears outmoded because of its narrow focus, applying only to industrial goods, 
including the industrial components of processed agricultural products produced in the Community or 
Turkey. The CU also includes those goods wholly or partially manufactured from products coming from 
third countries but which are in free circulation in the Community or in Turkey.2  
The rules determining the origin of a good are based on the principle of goods being wholly obtained in 
the exporting country, or substantially transformed there in accordance with product-specific rules. This 
is consistent with the approach followed in other EU RTAs signed during the 1990s. Under this approach, 
products not wholly obtained are subject to origin criteria that specify how much transformation of non-
originating materials must have taken place before a product can be considered eligible for preferences. 
Consequently, for the EU-Turkey Customs Union, products from third countries can only be considered to 
be in free circulation in the Community or in Turkey under the following circumstances: a) if the import 
formalities have been complied with, b) if any customs duties or charges having equivalent effect have 
been levied in the Community or in Turkey, and c) if they have not benefited from a total or partial 
reimbursement of such duties or charges. As a result, since the entry into force of the CU Turkey’s average 
MFN tariffs for industrial products has fallen significantly, and has remained low due to the ‘anchor’ 
provided by the Common External Tariff. However, for those sectors not covered by the CU, and most 
notably for agriculture, Turkey’s applied MFN tariffs have in more cases increased since the formation of 
the CU. As Section 3.2.1 indicates, this is significantly so in the case of sugar and meat for example. 
1.1.2 Institutional requirements 
As with the other Association Agreements negotiated by the EU, the institutional requirements of the EU-
Turkey CU are set out to establish equal representation of the parties. Article 23 of the Ankara Agreement 
requires that the Association Council shall consist of members of the Governments of the Member States 
and members of the Council and of the Commission of the Community on the one hand and of members 
of the Turkish Government on the other. The CU requires i) an association council, ii) an association 
committee and iii) a parliamentary committee are established by the completion of the CU in 1996. The 
Association Agreement requires the Association Council to act unanimously. Given there is equal 
representation of each party, both parties possess the right to veto any decision. However, the 
composition and the functioning rules of the decision-making organ of the treaty – the Association 
Council - preclude representation by individual EU Member States, preventing internal EU Member 
States’ dissonance from emerging during decision-making. 
The Parliamentary Committee set up under the Agreement serves to ‘ensure that everything functions 
well’ within the CU. Its mandate is to carry out exchange of views and information, formulate 
recommendations to the Association Council and deliver opinions with a view to ensuring the proper 
functioning of the customs union. Further, ‘the Parties shall consult within the Committee on any point 
relating to the implementation of the customs union decision which gives rise to a difficulty for either of 
them’. This means that there is no provision for either a competent jurisdiction or a similar institution to 
the European Commission that could independently monitor implementation or address weaknesses 
identified by the Parliamentary Committee. At the limit, this structure has been considered by Neuwahl 
(1999) to be an ‘institutional void’ denoting not so much to a lack of institutional structure for the 
 
2 Decision No. 1/95 Article 3. 
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implementation of the agreements but rather its diplomatic or intergovernmental character. This 
structure translates, in practice, into a lack of parliamentary control and an absence of recourse to judicial 
dispute settlement. Again, this presents a structure out of line with both EU and international norms and 
guidelines on transparency and inclusive governance. For example, the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism (DMS) is based on clearly-defined rules – the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, with 
clear timetables for completing a case. First rulings are made by a panel and then either endorsed or 
rejected by the WTO’s full membership. Subsequently, appeals that are based on points of law are also 
possible. The dispute settlement mechanism is the EU-Korea RTA is based on the WTO DSM but its 
procedures are faster. If consultations between the parties fail to reach a solution, the dispute is referred 
to an arbitration panel composed of 3 experts agreed to by the parties. After receiving the parties’ 
submissions, the panel holds a hearing that is open to the public, with opportunities for third parties to 
inform the panel through amicus curiae submissions. The Panel must normally rule with 120 days and its 
findings are binding. The following section highlights the stark differences between these DSM’s with the 
EU-Turkey CU.  
1.1.3 Dispute settlement 
In the event that a diplomatic solution to a difference concerning the operation of the CU cannot be 
found, there are theoretically three judicial methods available to settle disputes. For those related to the 
application or the interpretation of the agreement, the Court of Justice (CoJ) is potentially available. The 
Association Council must however take a unanimous decision to submit the dispute to the Court, again 
providing each party with the right to veto. Turkey may be reluctant to accept that the internal court of 
the EU would be wholly objective or impartial in settling disputes concerning the application and the 
interpretation of the Ankara Agreement. Indeed, the Association Council has not so far referred any 
dispute to be settled by the court of Justice of the European Union (CJEC). Nor has it utilised either of the 
other two options of submitting disputes to another existing unnamed court or tribunal or to arbitration.  
Decision 1/95 permits, for a limited number of cases, the rules and modalities of the establishment of an 
arbitral tribunal to which the contracting parties can submit the dispute during the definitive stage of the 
CU. Under the provisions of Article 61, if the Association Council fails to settle a dispute relating to the 
scope or duration of protection measures in an area of direct relevance to the functioning of the Customs 
Union, and which cause of threaten to cause impairment of the free movement of goods or deflections of 
trade or safeguard measures3 or rebalancing measures,4 then either Party may refer the dispute to 
arbitration within six months of the date on which the procedure was initiated. A dispute referred to 
arbitration requires three arbitrators appointed within two months, including one umpire selected from a 
list drawn up by the Association Council. The arbitration tribunal sits in Brussels and must take its 
decisions by majority.5   
Yet the enforcement of these decisions is limited by Article 25 of the Association Agreement which states 
each party shall be required to take the measures necessary to comply with the decisions, yet it does not 
provide for sanctions or remedies concerning non-compliance with these decisions. This could be a 
source of further disputes, when for example, a measure held to be in breach of the CU is not removed 
because there is little fear of punitive damages from continual non-compliance. The lack of remedies 
under the CU could operate to detract from using the dispute settlement mechanism to remove other 
unnecessary trade irritants in other non-tariff areas, such as TBT or customs requirements.  
 
 
3 Taken in accordance with Decision No. 1/95 Article 63 
4 Taken in accordance with Decision No. 1/95 Article 64 
5 Pursuant to Decision No. 1/95 Article 62  
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1.1.4 Excluded sectors 
As asserted, it is becoming increasingly significant that Turkey and the EU still do not have a treaty 
framework that binds market access services commitments, nor those covering the temporary 
movement of service providers, commercial presence or investment. With regard to public procurement, 
Decision 1/95 only pledged future negotiations and given that Turkey is not a signatory to the World 
Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Government Procurement, it is not a beneficiary of the EU’s 
commitments under that regime. Although intellectual property rights and obligations are treated by 
Decision 1/95, there is still an entire field of geographical indications (GIs) that is absent. This subject is 
notably present and accounted for in all the new EU trade agreements. The same can be said for trade, 
investment and sustainable development issues. In the EU-Canada RTA, for example, there are 
comprehensive chapters dedicated to trade and sustainable development, trade and the environment, 
trade and labour. Moreover, these provisions are binding enforced by the dispute settlement mechanism 
attached to the ‘trade and labour’ provisions. In case of disagreement, a Party may request consultations 
in order to review the provisions for the resolution of disputes provided for, with a view to reach a 
mutually agreed position on the matter.  
The overview provided in Table 3 confirms that with regard to the regulatory border and behind the 
border policies that are covered by the EU-Turkey CU, there are numerous divergences between this and 
the other deep integration agreements that the EU is currently negotiating and signing. 
1.2 Regulatory border and behind-the-border policies 
In addition to tariffs and related issues, the EU-Turkey CU requirements extend to rules and disciplines on 
various regulatory border and behind-the-border policies, such as customs modernisation, eliminating 
technical barriers to trade (TBTs), competition policies, intellectual property rights, and trade defence 
instruments. These are non-tariff barriers to the free movement of goods under the EU-Turkey CU. They 
are becoming increasingly more significant as the MFN tariff rates are progressively reduced. The 
following section looks at the specific policies in turn. 
1.2.1 Customs reform 
Prior to the formation of the CU, the import regime operating between the EU and Turkey was complex. 
EU goods accessing the Turkish market, faced a tradition paper based customs administration where 
declarants had to go to customs offices to register declarations. Since almost all shipments had to be 
physically inspected, the process at customs was very intrusive and time consuming. It often led traders 
to pay substantial facilitation money to speed up the process or to curry favour with customs officials in 
charge of their inspections. With the support of the World Bank, in 1995 Turkey began to modernise its 
customs administration, to speed up the release of goods, collect customs duties and related charges 
effectively, rationalise the clearance process, and simplify procedures while enhancing customs control 
and creating and transferring statistical data in a timely and reliable manner. The focus of the project was 
on modifying customs legislation according to CU requirements and the requirements of international 
customs standards developed by organisations such as the World Customs Organization. Other aims 
included developing and implementing computer systems and reorganising customs administration by 
creating a balance between customs control and trade facilitation in harmony with other international 
agreements and conventions that Turkey is party to.  
The EU Customs Code6 has been amended several times since 1992. It compiles the rules, arrangements 
and procedures applicable to goods traded between the European Community (EC) and non-member 
 
6 Regulation  (EU)  No  952/2013  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council of  9  October  2013 laying  down  the  Union  
Customs  Code (recast). 
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countries. As a single act covering the scope, definitions, basic provisions and content of Community 
customs law, it provides increased transparency. The Amendments to the Code have aimed to simplify 
and increase efficiency in its implementation, improve the rules on transit, security, preventing fraud and 
facilitating electronic declarations through granting Approved Economic Operator status and the one 
stop shop for importers and exporters. Following the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission adopted a proposal 
aimed at simplifying the legislation and administrative procedures governing imports and exports, 
creating a simple, paper-free environment for customs and trade and an electronic Community customs 
environment. As a result, Turkey has had to ensure that the necessary implementation and enforcement 
capacities, including links to the relevant EU computerised customs systems are up to date and, in place 
so that special rules laid down in related areas of the acquis could be followed. With the CU, Turkey 
adopted a new customs law similar to the EC's Customs Code, and as part of its trade facilitation work the 
Turkish Customs Administration (TCA) developed its ability to undertake its control function without the 
need to open every cargo shipment yet retain effective control over the flow of goods and duties 
payable. Over time Turkey has progressively achieved all of these goals.  
EU trade strategy is served by further internationalisation of EU customs procedures through Turkey’s 
harmonisation with the Customs Code. Harmonisation promotes simplicity and consistency of rules of 
origin and enhances cooperation between customs authorities, to ensure the most efficient electronic 
systems including electronic payments. It supports the European Commission’s Trade for all strategy for 
‘enhanced partnerships’ to extend and reinforce the current ‘market access partnership’ beyond the 
removal of obstacles to trade and investment, including customs cooperation activities, trade facilitation 
and sustainable development; and support the economic activities of SMEs.7  
1.2.2 Technical barriers to trade 
On the elimination of technical barriers to trade (TBTs) the EU’s consistent position is that transparency 
and predictability of the regulatory and standard-setting process is key to trade and growth in general. It 
has therefore been a strong advocate, in the TBT Committee, for improving regulatory and 
standardisation practices of WTO Members, in particular through the application of principles of 
transparency and good regulatory practice at all stages of the regulatory and standard-setting process as 
well as convergence to international standards. The EU has also increasingly adopted a risk-oriented 
approach in deciding what conformity assessment procedures should be used for assessing compliance 
of products. This further improves the implementation of transparency provisions to aid communication 
with trade partners on regulatory initiatives that might influence trade.  
There are essentially two ways to eliminate TBTs: harmonisation and mutual recognition. Since the 
establishment of the CU, Turkey has harmonised its standards with European and international ones. In 
addition, Turkey has harmonised its technical legislation with that of the EU, particularly in the New 
Approach area.8 Harmonisation of the legislation in the Old Approach area, however, is still incomplete. 
Furthermore, Turkey has established the quality infrastructure comparable to the EU’s, encompassing the 
operators and operation of standardisation, testing, certification, inspection, accreditation and 
 
7 See European Commission Report: Trade for all - Towards a more responsible trade and investment policy. 2015 p15.  
8 For the elimination of TBTs the EU, starting from 1960s until about the mid-1980s, has adopted the so called ‘Old Approach’, 
which aimed to achieve the harmonization of product norms in as much detail as possible. But it was emphasized by various 
economists that the Old Approach was slow, burdensome and unable to cope with the extensive variety of products which 
characterize modern economies.  As a result, the EU adopted the ‘New Approach’ which limited the harmonization to ‘essential 
requirements’ for protecting the common public interest in health, safety and environment. The process of specification of these 
essential requirements in technical standards is left to European standardization bodies such as the European Committee for 
Standardization (CEN), European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization (CENELEC) and European Telecommunications 
Standards Institute (ETSI). 
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metrology. Finally, Turkey took the necessary measures to develop the market surveillance and import 
control system as in the EU. 
In areas where the elimination of TBTs requires the adoption of mutual recognition approach, an EU 
Member State of destination has to allow Turkish products free access to its market, as long as the 
products provide an equivalent level of protection of the various legitimate interests involved.9 The same 
applies for products originating in an EU Member State, destined for Turkey. Both Turkey and the EU 
Member State of destination have the right to verify the equivalence of the level of protection provided 
by the product under scrutiny as compared to that provided by its own national rules. This is not a 
burden for products of EU origin, because as discussed above, EU product standards are based on 
international norms and risk assessments. However, in order to avoid the verification processes by EU 
Member State of destination, Turkey has to establish trust in its system of standards and conformity 
assessment procedures. As a result, the mutual recognition approach requires a relatively high degree of 
harmonised standards and testing procedures between the EU and Turkey. 
Until the formation of the CU, Turkey had neither the infrastructure nor the required technical knowledge 
required for the elimination of TBTs. In the 20 years that have passed since the establishment of the CU, 
Turkey has harmonised in the case of industrial goods its product standards to a very large extent with 
European and international ones; harmonised its technical legislation with that of the EU; established 
quality infrastructure comparable to the EU's; and developed a market surveillance and import control 
system as in the EU. These are remarkable achievements. However there are still areas where Turkey 
needs further alignment of its legislation and implementation with the acquis as emphasised recently by 
the European Commission (2015). 
1.2.3 Competition policy 
Competition laws and policies are important to underpin market liberalisation. Competition refers to 
inter-firm rivalry in markets, and is vital to ensure that consumers enjoy freedom of choice, low prices, 
and good value for money, while also serving as an important driver of innovation and productivity 
improvement. Competition makes important, ongoing contributions to the welfare of citizens. Without 
effective comprehensive competition policies, markets can be dominated by monopolies or cartels that 
can undermine the benefits of competition for consumers and businesses, particularly small and medium 
sized enterprises. 
Treaty-level provisions to safeguard competition were initially introduced in the European Coal and Steel 
Community in 1951. Ensuring undistorted competition was entrenched as a specific objective under the 
1957 Treaty of Rome. Alongside core provisions on cartels and abuse of dominance and merger control 
provisions, EU competition policy was unprecedented in incorporating rules to deal with the 
competition-distorting effects of state aid or subsidies, as well as to address barriers to competition 
resulting from government. The Treaty insulated competition law enforcement from political control by 
putting the decision making of the Commission under the jurisdictional control of the Court of Justice.  
Unlike the EU, until the adoption of the EU-Turkey CU, Turkey had no specific competition legislation and 
thus no competition policy enforcement. The agreement required Turkey to adopt EU competition rules, 
including measures regarding public aid. As a result, Turkey adopted the Law on the Protection of 
Competition, and established a Competition Authority (CA), aiming to ensure the formation and 
development of markets for goods and services in a free and sound competitive environment, observe 
the implementation of the Competition Law, and fulfil the duties assigned to it by the law. The CA has 
played an important role in moving the Turkish economy towards greater reliance on competition-based 
 
9 Pursuant to Communication 2003/C265/02.  
Bringing EU-Turkey trade and investment relations up to date? 
 
17 
and consumer-welfare-oriented market mechanisms. Turkey has shown significant progress on anti-trust 
issues, and the CA has a clear track record on implementing competition rules. 
Article 34 of the Customs Union Decision 1/95 prohibits Turkey and EU Member States from providing 
state resources to aid industrial goods in undertakings or industrial sectors where doing so distorts or 
threatens to distort competition between the EU and Turkey. Under the requirements of Article 39(2), 
Turkey must adapt all of its existing aid schemes to EU standards and comply with the notification and 
guideline procedures established by the EU to control aid provided by Member States. Although the law 
on State aid and subsidies was passed by Parliament in October 2010 the EU State Aid rules could still not 
be implemented because the implementing regulations have not been adopted. Thus, State aid is an 
area where Turkey needs further alignment of its legislation and implementation with the acquis. 
1.2.4 Intellectual property rights 
Ideas and knowledge are an increasingly important part of trade. Most of the value of new medicines and 
other high technology products lies in the amount of invention, innovation, research, design and testing 
involved. Films, music recordings, books, computer software and on-line services are bought and sold 
because of the information and creativity they contain, not usually because of the plastic, metal or paper 
used to make them. Creators of ideas and knowledge can be given the right to prevent others from using 
their inventions, designs or other creations — and to use that right to negotiate payment in return for 
others using them. These are “intellectual property rights” (IPRs). They take a number of forms. For 
example books, paintings and films come under copyright; inventions can be patented; brand names and 
product logos can be registered as trademarks; and so on.  
The EU actively seeks to promote IPRs on the basis that they support creativity and innovation in the EU 
that are intangible assets for European growth and competitiveness. It has been estimated that IPR-
intensive sectors account for around 39 % of EU GDP (worth some EUR 4.7 trillion annually) and, taking 
indirect jobs into account, up to 35 % of all jobs.10 Consequently, the effective enforcement of these 
rights both within and beyond the EU directly affects growth and employment in the EU. The EU is 
concerned that if IPRs are not adequately enforced, European ideas, brands and products can be pirated 
and counterfeited. Estimates suggest that the EU loses about EUR8 billion of its GDP a year because of 
counterfeiting and piracy.11 This will not only impact on EU employment prospects, but also consumer 
health and safety generally. Therefore, the EU has been concerned to promulgate appropriate, 
transparent and predictable IPR legal regimes.12 Intellectual property right-holders require access to 
effective ways of protecting their rights both domestically and internationally. Under EU policy, optimal 
and economically efficient IP infrastructure encompasses the legal recognition, registration, utilisation 
and balanced enforcement of all forms of IPRs.  
Article 31 and Annex 8 of Decision 1/95 require that Turkey must ensure adequate protection and 
enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR), have implemented the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) by 1999, adopt legislation by January 1, 
1999 to secure the patentability of pharmaceutical products and processes, and accede to various 
international conventions on IPR specified in the CU Decision 1/95. While Turkey has made substantial 
efforts to align its legislation with the acquis since 1995, and the Turkish Patent Institute (TPI) was 
 
10 Intellectual property rights intensive industries: contribution to economic performance and employment in the European 
Union, Industry-Level Analysis Report, Joint project between the European Patent Office and the Office for Harmonisation in the 
Internal Market, Munich and Alicante, 2013. 
11 CEBR, The impact of counterfeiting on four main sectors in the European Union, Centre for Economic and Business Research, 
London, 2000.  
12 Trade, growth and intellectual property - Strategy for the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights in third 
countries. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social 
Committee. SWD(2014) 204 final.  
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established in 1994, challenges remain which undermine the enforcement of EU IPR policies. The main 
problem with IPR in Turkey, however, is with the enforcing legislation, as it requires specific skills. 
Although a relatively large number of judges, lawyers, enforcement staff, police force members, and 
customs officers have been trained in IPR-related issues, more are needed. Turkey is aware of the fact that 
it has to provide the measures, procedures, and remedies necessary to ensure fair and equitable 
enforcement of IPR. 
1.2.5 Trade defence instruments 
An important obstacle for the liberalisation of trade in goods is the continued application of trade 
defense instruments (TDIs) such as anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures. It is important to emphasise 
here that the use of such measures is contradictory to the principles of the Single Market. For example 
TDIs are not utilised in intra EU trade. In the EU-Turkey CU the use of TDIs were permitted in order to force 
the parties in particular Turkey to observe the rules of the CU such as rules on elimination of TBTs, 
competition policy and IPRs. But to minimise the detrimental effects of TDIs Turkey was required to 
approximate and implement the EU’s common commercial policy regulations, including procedures for 
anti-dumping, countervailing duties, surveillance, and safeguards measures, as well as administering 
quantitative quotas and procedures for officially supported export credits. Since the formation of the CU, 
Turkey has successfully adopted all related EU rules and regulations and is effectively implementing 
them. But as emphasised by the World Bank (2014) both the EU and Turkey have made extensive use of 
TDIs threatening trade between the parties. It is emphasised that greater cooperation is needed between 
the EU and Turkey to ensure continued détente in the use of the TDIs. 
1.3 Quantitative analysis of the EU-Turkey Customs Union 
This section briefly considers EU-Turkish trade performance prior to the formation of the CU and 
thereafter, Turkish foreign direct investment (FDI) performance prior to the establishment of the CU and 
thereafter, and quantitative studies of the EU-Turkey CU. 
The CU has had positive effects both for the EU and Turkey. Prior to the formation of the CU, Turkey’s 
economy wide nominal protection rate (NPR) in trade with the EU amounted to 10.2 % and in trade with 
third countries 22.1 % (Togan, 1997). With the formation of the CU, NPRs decreased substantially in 
almost all sectors. The economy-wide NPR during 2001 in trade with the EU amounted to 1.3 %, and in 
the case of trade with third countries, the average NPR amounted to 6.9 %. For example, the average NPR 
decreased from 22.1 % to 1.3 % for Israel and Central and Eastern European countries that the EU had 
FTAs with. For developing countries that are granted generalised system of preferences (GSP) treatment, 
the average NPR decreased from 22.1 % in 1994 to 2.7 % in 2001. Finally, for countries like the US, Japan, 
and Canada, for which the EU applies most favoured nation (MFN) tariffs, average NPR decreased from 
22.1 % in 1994 to 6.9 % in 2001. Thus, regarding access to the Turkish market, almost all countries in the 
world have benefited from NPR reductions in Turkey. Regarding access of Turkish goods to the EU 
market, the EU had abolished nominal tariff rates on imports of industrial goods from Turkey on 
September 1, 1971. 
From the EU perspective, the rise in FDI to Turkey from the EU has been significant along with the deeper 
integration between Turkish and European firms along production networks. Trade and investment 
linkages between the EU and Turkey have deepened reaching USD147 billion in 2012 making Turkey the 
EU’s sixth largest trading partner and the EU Turkey’s biggest. The EU is the largest foreign investor in 
Turkey, accounting for three-quarters of total foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows during the last five 
years. Foreign investment into Turkey is mostly for services and manufacturing. The largest investors 
include Bosch, Mercedes and Toyota. However, investments in agro-processing are significant and 
growing, accounting for 7 per cent of FDI inflows since 2007. Nevertheless, as discussed below, FDI into 
Turkey remains low compared to other fast growing emerging markets.  
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The CU has brought greater benefits than an FTA between the EU and Turkey would have because it has 
provided an anchor on Turkey’s applied tariffs for industrial products and negated the need for rules of 
origin on bilateral trade.  However, as emphasised below, the CU has not caused a major shift in relative 
trade shares for Turkey because the EU had already opened its markets for Turkish exports of industrial 
goods long before the CU came into effect. Estimates suggest that EU exports to Turkey would have been 
4.2 per cent lower if the rules of origin were more restrictive and Turkey maintained its MFN tariffs for 
industrial products at current levels. Moreover, the CU has also coincided with more deeply integrated 
production networks between Turkish and EU firms, particularly in the automobiles and clothing sectors. 
Consequently, intra-industry trade between Turkey and the EU has increased from 30 per cent in 1990 to 
over 50 per cent. The reduction in trade costs associated with the CU, including the harmonisation of 
standards and elimination of rules of origin is likely to have promoted growing intra-industry trade along 
global value chains, which are known to be particularly sensitive to trade costs.  
1.3.1 Trade performance 
Table 1 shows the developments in EU and Turkish trade prior to and after the formation of the CU. In 
1995 Turkish exports of agricultural and industrial products to the EU-28 amounted to USD12.2 billion 
(56.3 % of Turkey’s exports); while imports of agricultural and industrial products from the EU-28 
amounted to USD18 billion (50.4 % of Turkey’s imports).13 With the formation of the CU the share of 
imports from the EU-28 in total imports went up from 50.4 % in 1995 to 55.8% in 1996, fluctuated around 
54.2 % during the period 1997-2000, and then declined considerably over the period 2001-2008 reaching 
36.9 % in 2008. By 2014 the share of imports from the EU in total imports stood at 36.7 %. On the other 
hand, the share of exports to the EU-28 in total exports declined as shown in Figure 1 from 56.3 % in 1995 
to 51.3 % in 1997 and increased to 58.1 % in 1999, but thereafter the share fluctuated during the period 
2000-2007 around 57 %, and started to decline thereafter. By 2014 the share of exports to the EU in total 
exports had reached to 43.5 %. Finally, note that the share of EU exports to Turkey in total EU exports as 
shown in Figure 2 has increased 0.67 % in 1995 to 0.94 % in 1997, declined to 0.65 % in 2001, increased 
thereafter reaching 1.21 % in 2011, and declined afterwards to 1.11 % in 2014. On the other hand, the 
share of EU imports from Turkey in total EU imports has increased 0.48 % in 1995 to 0.54 % in 1998, 
declined to 0.53 % in 2000, increased thereafter reaching 0.91 % in 2007, declined to 0.82 % in 2009, 






13 In 1958 Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and Netherlands became members of the European Economic 
Community (EEC) that was formed by the Treaty of Rome in 1957. In 1973 Denmark, Ireland and United Kingdom joined the 
European Community (EC); Greece joined the EC in 1981; Spain and Portugal joined the EC in 1986; Austria, Finland and Sweden 
joined the EU in 1995; Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined 
the EU in 2004; Bulgaria and Romania became members of the EU in 2007; and Croatia joined the EU in 2013. Although in 1990 
16 of the above mentioned members were not members of the EC we consider in the following for reasons of consistency data 
for EU-28 consisting of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, and Croatia over the entire period 1990-2014. 
 





Comparison of the growth rate of EU-28 exports to Turkey prior to the formation of the CU with those 
observed after the formation of the CU reveals that the average growth rate of exports from the EU-28 
has declined from 9.1 % experienced during 1990-1995 to -2.5 % during the period 1996-2001, but 
thereafter picked up and increased to 16.9 % over the period 2002-2008. During 2010-2014 the average 
growth rate of exports from the EU-28 into Turkey amounted to 4.2 %. On the other hand the effect of the 
CU on exports seems also to be of limited importance initially. Whereas the annual average growth rate 
of exports to the EU-28 was 8.5 % prior to the formation of the CU, it had declined to 6.2 % over the 
period 1996-2001, but increased thereafter to 18.8 % over the period 2002-2008. The average growth rate 
of exports to EU-28 over the period 2010-2014 declined to 5.2 %. 
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Comparison of the growth rate of exports from the EU-28 into Turkey prior to the formation of the CU 
with those observed after the formation of the CU reveals that the average growth rate of imports from 
the EU-28 has declined from 9.1 % experienced during 1990-1995 to -2.5 % during the period 1996-2001, 
but thereafter picked up and increased to 16.9 % over the period 2002-2008. During 2010-2014 the 
average growth rate of imports from the EU-28 amounted to 4.2 %. On the other hand the effect of the 
CU on exports seems also to be of limited importance initially. Whereas the annual average growth rate 
of exports to the EU-28 was 8.5 % prior to the formation of the CU, it had declined to 6.2 % over the 
period 1996-2001, but increased thereafter to 18.8 % over the period 2002-2008. The average growth rate 
of exports to EU-28 over the period 2010-2014 declined to 5.2 %. 
1.3.2 Foreign direct investment 
Despite its location and natural advantage, Turkey was generally fairly unsuccessful in attracting stable 
inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) from abroad. During the period 1990-1995, total annual FDI into 
Turkey inflows amounted to only USD745 million, as shown in Table 2. The country’s failure to attract 
large foreign investment inflows was mainly due to economic and political uncertainties surrounding the 
country and the enormous institutional, legal and judicial obstacles faced by foreign investors in Turkey. 
Foreign-owned firms had been subject to special authorisations and sectoral limitations. According to the 
Foreign Investment Advisory Service (2001a, 2001b) seven major problems impeded the operations of 
FDI enterprises up until the early 2000s: (i) political instability, (ii) government hassle, (iii) a weak judicial 
system, (iv) heavy taxation, (v) corruption, (vi) deficient infrastructure and (vii) competition from the 
informal economy.  
During the period 1996-2000 annual average FDI inflows only increased slightly, amounting to USD846 
million, showing no immediate substantial increase in FDI inflows after the formation of the CU. However, 
this may be attributable to global trends and in particular emerging market financial crises, rather than 
any defect on the part of the CU. The FDI inflows started to increase only after 2001, and reached USD20.2 
billion in 2006, USD22 billion in 2007 and USD19.9 billion in 2008. This considerable increase in FDI 
inflows seems to be due mainly the EU’s 2004 decision to begin membership negotiations with Turkey, 
liberalisation measures introduced during the period after the 2001 crisis and implementation of the 
privatisation program after 2002. During 2009 FDI inflow decreased to USD8.6 billion and attained a value 
of USD9 billion during 2010 due to the financial crisis. Finally, during the period 2011-2014 it has 
fluctuated around the average value of USD13.7 billion. 




Although we have data on total FDI inflows collected by the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey over 
the period 1990-2014, data on FDI inflows from the EU started to be collected only relatively recently (in 
2002). Table 2 reveals that total FDI inflow has grown during the period 1990-1995 at an annual rate of 
0.4 %. After the formation of the CU the growth rate of FDI inflow during the period 1996-2000 increased 
to 5.9 %, but then decreased to -1 % during the period 2001-2004. After increasing at the annual rate of 
21.4 % during the period 2005-2008, the rate of growth of FDI inflows decreased to -7.8 % during the 
period 2011-2014, reflecting the impact of the financial crisis. On the other hand, consideration of the 
share of FDI inflows from the EU countries in total FDI inflows into Turkey reveals that the share has 
fluctuated during the period 2002-2014 between 33.2 % and 71.8 %. As of 2014 the share of FDI inflows 
from the EU countries into Turkey in total FDI inflows into Turkey amounted to 43.2 %.  
Similarly, the share of FDI from the EU countries to Turkey in total FDI outflows from the EU has fluctuated 
between 0.19 % (2002) and 2.32 % (2012), and as of 2014 the share of FDI from the EU countries to Turkey 
in total FDI outflows from the EU amounted to 1.97 %. The annual growth rate of FDI inflows from EU 
countries has decreased from 79.8 % during 2002-2008 to -25.3 % during 2011- 2014. These 
developments could be explained by the change in perception of EU investors about course of Turkish 
accession negotiations. Initially, the perception was that Turkey's investment climate would improve over 
time as accession negotiation progressed. But this perception changed over time as can be seen from 
Table 2. The various international competitiveness studies like the Doing Business Survey of the World 
Bank did also not reflect an improvement in Turkish investment climate, and in 2016 Doing Business 
Survey Turkey is still ranked as the 55th country among 189 countries. 
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1.3.3 Impact of the EU-Turkey Customs Union 
The existing literature on the effects of the EU-Turkey CU has focused on the one hand on ex-ante studies 
and on the other hand on ex-post studies. While the ex-ante studies are of computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) type, ex-post studies use mostly the gravity model to assess the impact of the CU on 
trade and welfare.  
One of the earliest ex-ante studies of the EU-Turkey CU is that by Harrison et al. (1997). Using a CGE model 
the authors conclude that the CU generates welfare gains for Turkey of 1-1.5 % of its GDP. On the other 
hand, Lejour and de Mooij (2005) estimate the effects of the EU-Turkey CU for both the EU countries and 
Turkey. On the basis of a CGE model for the world economy, the authors find the agricultural, textile and 
apparel sectors would suffer a small decline in the EU countries, whereas the chemicals, metals and 
transport equipment sectors were predicted to expand marginally in the EU countries. Overall they 
suggest that that the effects of Turkey’s accession to the single market are substantial and positive for 
Turkey, small but positive for mainly the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries that have acceded 
to the EU in 2004, and negligible for the EU-15.  
Among the ex-post studies of the EU-Turkey CU two recent studies are of major importance. The World 
Bank (2014) estimates a gravity model using a dummy variable for the EU-Turkey CU. The coefficient 
estimate was 0.2 suggesting a 22 % increase in bilateral trade due to CU, though this effect was not 
statistically significant. On the other hand, Magee (2015) concludes that the CU has generated more than 
twice as much trade creation as trade diversion, but that the overall impact of the CU has been relatively 
small.14 The World Bank report further notes that the CU has coincided with more deeply integrated 
production networks between Turkish and EU firms, particularly in the automobiles and clothing sectors. 
Consequently, intra-industry trade between Turkey and the EU has increased from 30 per cent in 1990 to 
over 50 per cent. The reduction in trade costs associated with the CU, including the harmonisation of 
standards and elimination of rules of origin is likely to have promoted growing intra-industry trade along 
global value chains, which are known to be particularly sensitive to trade costs. 
 
 
14 A regional trade agreement (RTA) creates a preference favoring trade with an RTA partner country, whose imports face no 
tariffs, over other countries whose imports are taxed. When imports from low-cost countries outside the regional trading area are 
replaced by imports from higher cost countries within the RTA, we talk of trade diversion. On the other hand, trade creation is 
generated when the lower tariffs within the trading block allow inefficient domestic production to be replaced by cheaper 
imports from a preferential trading partner.  
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2 Evaluating the EU-Turkey Customs Union 
As Chapter 1 highlighted, the EU-Turkey CU of 1995 has been a major instrument of integration into the 
EU and global markets for Turkey, offering the country powerful tools to reform its economy. It has 
credibly locked Turkey into a liberal foreign trade regime for industrial goods. As a result, Turkish 
producers of industrial goods have become exposed to competition from imports and they operate 
within one of the largest FTAs for industrial products in the world. They are protected by tariffs from 
external competition to exactly the same extent that EU producers are, and as such, face competition 
from duty-free imports of industrial goods from world-class pan-European firms. In return, Turkish 
industrial producers have duty-free market access to the European Economic Area.  
But the EU-Turkey CU has not been without its critics. Akman (2010) points out the following problems: 
i) The EU has its own priorities reflected in its FTAs that are concluded, and these agreements do 
not take into account Turkey’s special interests. 
ii) Turkey suffers tariff revenue losses. In particular, imports from third countries by way of trade 
deflection via the EU induce tariff revenue losses for Turkey.  
iii) Turkey cannot enter into FTAs with third countries with which the EU has not accorded a deal.15 
iv) There are latecomer effects. In particular, Turkey can conclude FTAs only after the EU has 
concluded the FTAs. This puts Turkish exporters into disadvantageous position with regards to EU 
exporters, who can obtain preferential status by penetrating into third country markets several 
years earlier. 
v) Some of EU’s trade partners that had concluded FTAs with the EU or continue to negotiate FTAs 
with the EU refrain from concluding FTAs with Turkey despite the ‘Turkey Clause’ included in FTAs 
concluded by the EU.16 
The World Bank (2014) considers in addition to the criticisms stated above the following problems: 
a. The road transport quotas and transit permits hinder the free circulation of goods covered by the 
CU.  
b. The use of Trade Defence Instruments such as anti-dumping and safeguard measures harms 
trade.  
c. The current visa regime has repercussions on EU-Turkey trade and business relationships. 
On the other hand, the European Commission (2015) criticises not the CU per se, but rather the slow 
progress achieved by Turkey in fulfilling the requirements of the CU. In particular it points out that some 
TBTs delay or prevent the free movement of goods in violation of Turkey's obligations under the CU; that 
Turkey needs to implement state aid law without further delay to ensure effective monitoring of aid 
schemes and proper alignment with the acquis; that Turkey needs to improve enforcement measures in 
fight against piracy and counterfeiting; and that Turkey has to remove import and export restrictions 
preventing the effective free movement of goods. 
 
15 See legal discussion in section 2.1 below. 
16 The Turkey Clause has been included in EU FTAs to signal the intention for EU FTA partners to start negotiating a FTA with 
Turkey on the basis of the findings of a joint feasibility study, however, but it cannot force third countries to conclude a 
negotiation with Turkey. It was first used in the EU’s negotiations with Algeria in 2005. 
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2.1 Strengths and weaknesses: The legal framework 
The framework of the CU offers incentives to Turkey to align with EU law due to its implicit hint of a 
further accession process, yet there are no explicit provisions in the CU to bind commitments beyond the 
trade in industrial goods on the part of the EU. Nevertheless, as noted in Section 1.2, due to the separate 
track under the accession process, Turkey’s actual alignment to EU internal market law has advanced in 
certain areas, such as free movement of goods, competition policy and State aid, energy, economic and 
monetary policy, enterprise and industrial policy, as well as in consumer protection, statistics, Trans-
European Networks, and science and research. Yet there have been various delays in opening new 
chapters for negotiation under the accession process. There are clear political, economic and legal 
dimensions to the structure of the CU plan. As a result association law is not unified under one regime, 
rather it is made up of different legal principles derived from different primary and secondary association 
rules along with various and interpretations set out in CJEU case law. 
This section identifies poor rules alignment as well as any legal challenges caused by the growing reality 
gap between this static legal framework and a dynamic modern economy. It divides this analysis into 
‘internal’ and ‘external’ legal requirements. 
2.1.1 Internal requirements of EU-Turkey Customs Union 
While commercial agreements between the EU and third parties are explicitly provided by Article 207 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU), the association agreements, such as with Turkey, have 
been concluded under the broader and more flexible wording provided for under Article 217. This 
provision can provide for deeper integration agreements extending beyond purely commercial purposes 
such as those with economic, social, political and cultural relations, as well as agreements that adopt CU. 
Thus the Turkish association agreement aimed to achieve a CU over three stages and alignment to the 
four freedoms with the long-term goal of preparing Turkey for accession. However, to recall, it does not 
provide a binding roadmap for accession.  
As noted above, Association law is not a single regime, rather it consists of different layers of legal 
principles made up from the Ankara Agreement, the Additional Protocol from 1970 and the Association 
Council Decisions 2/76, 1/80, 3/80 and 1/95. Since 1987, the CoJ has also been regularly called upon to 
rule on the legal implications of this body of EU-Turkey Association law. As a result, the Turkish 
association suffers from a case-by-case approach built on a static association initiated over 50 years ago. 
The EU institutions are not required to interpret the Ankara Agreement, the Additional Protocol from 
1970 and the Association Council Decisions in the same dynamic teleological fashion as employed when 
interpreting the EU Treaty provisions. Further legal developments can only be achieved through novel 
Association Council Decisions specifying rights or drafting of a more dynamic legal framework such as an 
RTA (see Chapter 3 Options). 
2.1.2 External requirements of GATT Article XXIV 
The formation of preferential agreements is subject to the legal conditions set out under the GATT Article 
XXIV. Agreements such as the EU-Turkey CU must conform to the requirement to apply ‘substantially the 
same’ duties and other regulations of commerce to the trade of non-members. Consequently, although 
the EU does not have to align itself to Turkey’s external agreements, it must still comply with GATT Article 
XXIV’s CU requirements for a harmonised external regime. For its part, Turkey must take the necessary 
measures and negotiate agreements on a mutually advantageous basis with the countries concerned - in 
order to align its commercial policy for industrial goods with the EU’s external FTA regimes.17 A fault line 
 
17 Article 16 of Decision 1/95. 
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emerges however, because while under the CU Turkey is obliged to align with the preferential 
agreements that the Community signs with third countries, these third countries do not have any 
obligation to conclude such agreements with Turkey. Indeed, it is more advantageous for these countries 
not to conclude preferential agreements with Turkey because they already have access to the Turkish 
market through the EU-Turkey CU. However, if Turkey does not conclude agreements with third parties 
signing preferential agreements with the EU, Turkey must apply reduced or zero tariff rates for the 
imported products from these countries in order to comply with its obligations under the EU-Turkey CU. 
To provide transitional adjustment support to Turkey, a compensatory levy provision was established for 
the first five years of the implementation of the CU. 18 This aimed at reducing Turkey’s economic burden 
but it was a complicated calculation: Where Turkey maintained a tariff policy different from that of the 
Community, goods imported from third countries into the Community and released for free circulation 
with preferential treatment by reason of their country of origin or of exportation were subject to the 
payment of a compensatory levy imported into Turkey from countries to which the same preferential 
tariff treatment is not granted by Turkey and inter alia, the duty to be paid in Turkey is at least five 
percentage points higher than that applicable in the Community, and an important distortion of traffic 
related to these goods has been observed. The structural asymmetry and temporary and over-
complicated compensatory instrument as set out under the CU framework and the Association 
Agreement served to undermine the EU-Turkey CU’s perceived legitimacy. Turkey cannot take part in the 
negotiations between the EU and third countries’ and moreover, neither can Turkey unilaterally apply 
new EU negotiated preferences to the trading partner since this would trigger violations of the GATT’s 
cornerstone principle the most-favoured nation obligation (Mathis, 2013). Because countries inside and 
outside the region are treated differently and this may have a negative effect on countries outside the 
region. GATT Article XXIV prohibits exceptions to the MFN requirement unless tariffs and other barriers to 
trade are eliminated on substantially all trade within the region as long as they don’t raise barriers to 
third parties.  
In sum, the existing legal and institutional framework of the CU translates into an overall relationship of 
general dependency both economically and politically of Turkey upon the EU. Turkey is obliged to adopt 
a considerable part of the acquis in several fields and to align its custom and commercial legislation with 
the EU legislation, without involvement in the EU’s external trade decision-making processes with regard 
to negotiating FTAs with third parties. Without setting out a binding roadmap to membership these 
systemic weaknesses undermine the legitimacy of the relationship and creates for Turkey a sovereignty 
shortfall. The obligation to align with the preferential agreements of the Community is coupled with the 
obligation not to participate to other free trade agreements. 
 
18 Ibid. 
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3 Recent developments in the world economy 
This section assesses the international context in which the outmoded CU now operates. It postulates 
that, during the period when Turkey was trying to implement the requirements of the EU-Turkey CU, 
major changes were taking place in the world economy. Since the mid-1980s developments in telecom 
and internet have triggered a suite of information management innovations that made it easier and 
cheaper to coordinate complex production activities from a distance. As a result some production stages 
previously performed in close proximity were dispersed geographically. 
Manufacturing today is increasingly managed through global value chains (GVC). While before 1985 
successful industrialisation meant building a domestic supply chain, today developing countries join 
GVCs and grow rapidly because offshore production brings elements that took Germany and Korea 
decades to develop domestically. A good example is China. According to Baldwin (2013) the heart of GVC 
trade is an intertwining of trade in goods; international investment; and cross-border flow of knowhow. 
To benefit from increased GVC trade it is very important that tariffs are eliminated, transport cost and 
administrative costs are low, and delays do not occur. On the other hand, lower barriers to investment are 
a must for participating in GVC trade, as they facilitate investments by lead firms leading to integration of 
economies in international production networks. Furthermore, a high quality transport infrastructure 
with major international gateways and corridor infrastructures such as airports, harbours, railways and 
highways facilitates economies’ participation in GVCs. 
The industrial counties US, EU and Japan, noting that GVC trade is not global and rather regional, have 
decided to establish the rules of GVC trade regionally rather than multilaterally. They started to sign free 
trade agreements (FTA) with deep provisions that are pro GVC trade. They also signed Bilateral 
Investment Treaties (BIT) tackling different investment issues. As a result, the centricity of WTO in global 
trade governance started to erode. Recently, the US and the EU started to negotiate mega regionals such 
as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). In 
addition, the EU and US have concluded deep and comprehensive FTAs with Korea, and EU with Canada. 
It seems that in the future, as emphasised by Baldwin (2014), WTO will continue governing the traditional 
trade while mega-regionals will set the rules in general for the 21st century international trade. 
Traditional trade refers to an economy in which goods made in one nation and sold to another. The rules 
of international trade after World War II were set first by General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
and thereafter by World Trade Organization (WTO). This rule based trading system is based on norms that 
are almost universally accepted. Within WTO disputes are adjudicated by an international court whose 
rulings are almost universally implemented, membership to WTO is almost universal, and decisions at 
WTO are made by consensus.  
The contemporary WTO framework provides a legal regulatory framework that extends beyond tariffs to 
subsidies in goods, services, intellectual property rights, government procurement and agriculture. 
However, developments in international trade and technology require solutions that move beyond the 
current negotiations. The current post-Nairobi Agenda is focused on agricultural subsidies than 
addressing issues raised by global value chains and the need for sustainable development strategies. 
Regional agreements are more flexible negotiating instruments that can more rapidly deployed to 
address the increased importance of services and the interlinkages between added value goods and 
services. Regional agreements are also better placed to include WTO+ frameworks that can manage the 
impact of trade and investment on labour standards, environmental management and sustainability. 
Specific bespoke measures can be established to address development interests such as increasing SME 
participation in the economy, and particularly procurement markets. As in the EU-Canada agreement, 
comprehensive chapters can be included to ensure trade and investment does not only lead to a 
lowering of social and environmental standards to attract interest, but also to promote the raising of 
standards, good governance and rules based approaches to development.  In sum: while the WTO 
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continues to perform a pivotal role in regulating the traditional economy, the spread of multilateral rules 
to new areas such as GVC and sustainability, is clearly facing the challenges attached to concluding 
consensus based agreements among over 160 Members.  
The following section provides an overview of the deeper integration agreements that are emerging to 
complement the multilateral trading system. 
3.1 The arrival of deep integration agreements 
Table 3 compares the scope and coverage of the TPP and TTIP among themselves as well as TPP and TTIP 
with the EU-Korea FTA (KOREU), Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) and 
the EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). Among these agreements TTIP will 
probably be the most comprehensive trade and investment agreement. Although at this time we do not 
have a text of the TTIP agreement, the EU Commission has made a large body of EU negotiating texts 
publically available.19 On the other hand, Ministers of the TPP countries – Australia, Brunei Darussalam, 
Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, United States, and Vietnam – 
announced on October 4, 2015 conclusion of their negotiations, and made the text of the agreement 
public.20 Note that the KOREU was ratified on May 4, 2011, and that the Canada-EU summit on September 
26, 2014 in Ottawa marked the end of the negotiations of the EU-Canada trade agreement. Finally, note 
that the EU and Ukraine signed the DCFTA on June 27, 2014 as part of their broader Association 
Agreement, and the EU and Ukraine started to apply the DCFTA on January 1, 2016. 
Table 3 Comparing the Scope and Coverage of TTIP, TPP, KOREU, CETA, and EU-Ukraine DCFTA 








          
Trade in Goods and 
Customs Duties(*) 
National Treatment 
& Market Access for 
Goods(*) 
National Treatment 
& Market Access for 
Goods(*) 
National Treatment 
& Market Access for 
Goods 
National Treatment 
& Market Access for 
Goods(*) 
- Textiles and Apparel - - - 
- - - Agriculture - 
Services 
 
Cross Border Trade 
in Services 
 
Trade in Services, 
Establishment and 
Electronic Commerce 




in Services and 
Electronic Commerce 
- Financial Services Financial Services Financial Services Financial Services 




- Electronic Commerce Electronic Commerce Electronic Commerce Electronic Commerce 
- 
 




Temporary Entry Temporary Presence of 
Natural Persons for 
Business Purposes 
- - Computer Services - Computer Services 
- - Postal and Courier 
Services 









- - Exceptions - - 
 
19 See the website http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1230.  
20 See the website https://ustr.gov/tpp/.  
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 TTIP TPP EU-Korea FTA EU-Canada CETA EU-Ukraine DCFTA 
- - 
 
Payment and Capital 
Movements 
- Current Payments and 
Movement of Capital 
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Rules of Origin 
 
Rules of Origin and 
Origin Procedures 
Rules of Origin Rules of Origin and 
Origin Procedures 


















Technical Barriers to 
Trade 
Technical Barriers to 
Trade 
Technical Barriers to 
Trade 




- - Mutual recognition on 
conformity assessment 
- 







Food Safety and 


















TBTs and SPS in 
Specific Industries 




Chemicals - Chemicals - - 
Cosmetics - - - - 
Engineering - - - - 
Medical Devices - Medical Devices - - 












Pharmaceuticals - Pharmaceuticals - - 
Textiles - - - - 
Vehicles - Motor vehicles and 
parts 
Motor Vehicles - 




             
Sustainable 
Development 








Labour Labour Labour Labour - 
Environment Environment Environment Environment - 
Energy and Raw 
Materials 
- - - Trade-Related 
Energy 
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 TTIP TPP EU-Korea FTA EU-Canada CETA EU-Ukraine DCFTA 





Customs and Trade 
Facilitation 
Customs and Trade 
Facilitation 











Investment - Investment - 
- - - Subsidies - 
Competition Competition Policy Competition Competition policy Competition 
- State-Owned 
Enterprises 
- State owned 
enterprises 
Public Enterprises and 
State Monopolies 











































        
- Cooperation and 
Capacity Building 
- Domestic regulation - 
- Competitiveness and 
Business Facilitation 
- - - 
- Development - - - 
- Transparency and 
Anti-Corruption 
Transparency Transparency Transparency 
- Administrative and 
Institutional 
Provisions 




- Exceptions - Exceptions - 
- Final Provisions Institutional, 






- - - - General Provisions 
- - - Dialogues and 
bilateral cooperation 
- 
(*) Note that TTIP under 'Trade in Goods and Customs Duties'; TPP, EU-Korea FTA, and EU-Ukraine DCFTA under 'National 
Treatment and Market Access for Goods' cover both agricultural and industrial goods. On the other hand, TPP has a separate 
chapter on 'Textiles and Apparel'. While the EU-Canada CETA under 'National Treatment and Market Access for Goods' covers 
industrial goods only, there is a separate chapter on Agriculture. 
The TTIP agenda can be summarised under three headings: market access, regulatory cooperation, and 
rules. While market access comprises the traditional tariffs and customs matters, services, origin rules, and 
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government procurement, regulatory co-operation focuses on elimination of TBTs and issues related with 
food safety, animal and plant health. Finally, rules concentrates on sustainable development, trade 
facilitation, investment protection, competition policy, intellectual property rights (IPR) and geographic 
indicators (GI), investor-to-state dispute settlement (ISDS) and government-to government dispute 
settlement. Since, differences in regulation between the parties may render bilateral trade to be more 
costly than it needs to be, the emphasis in TTIP is on regulation.  
Recent developments to investment arbitration have emerged in the TTIP negotiations and the amended 
CETA text. ISDS has been extensively criticised on the grounds that it affects the right of Member States 
to regulate in order to achieve legitimate policy objectives such as the protection of consumers, and that 
investment dispute system through international arbitration lacks transparency. Arbitrators may lack 
independence and impartiality; they may be chosen from an elite group of arbitrators; ISDS may also lead 
to inconsistency and unpredictability of decisions. More recently, the EU has tried to satisfy such criticism 
within the context of TTIP negotiations formally presented its new approach on investment protection 
and investment dispute resolution to the US on November 12, 2015.21 The objective of the new approach 
is to safeguard the EU and its Member States' right to regulate, while continuing to provide effective 
protection to foreign companies against unfair treatment, discrimination or other obligations through 
the Investment Court System. The EU is supporting the establishment of an Investment Court System to 
effectively safeguard the EU and its Member States’ right to regulate, while continuing to provide 
effective protection to European companies against unfair treatment, discrimination or other basic 
obligations. This will be ensured through a new fully transparent system for resolving investment 
disputes, with publicly appointed judges, the highest ethical standards and the possibility to have errors 
corrected through an appeal instance. 
TPP covers more or less similar issues as the TTIP. The main differences between TTIP and TPP is 
stemming from the characteristics of the negotiators involved. While TTIP is negotiated between rather 
homogeneous trading blocs EU and US, TPP is negotiated among countries with different incomes per 
capita and levels of development of public governance. Hence emphasis in the two agreements is quite 
different. The main differences between TTIP and TPP can be summarised as follows: First, while TTIP 
draft texts encompass articles on the elimination of TBTs and on sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) 
measures in specific sectors of importance to the EU and US such as cosmetics, engineering, medical 
devices, pesticides, information and communications technology, textiles, vehicles, pharmaceuticals and 
chemicals, the TPP covers the elimination of TBT and SPS measures in general terms and include to a 
large extent material that has been agreed upon in WTO. Second, TPP has adopted the negative list 
approach to liberalisation of services liberalising every service sector unless otherwise specified. Sector 
specific issues are discussed in financial services and telecommunications. Furthermore TPP has specific 
chapters on electronic commerce and temporary entry of business persons. 
Third, TPP when considering the removal of direct trade barriers and lowering tariffs concentrate in 
addition in contrast to TTIP on problems specific to textile and apparel sector. Fourth, while TTIP has a 
separate chapter on energy and raw materials, the same is not true in the case of TPP. Fifth, while TPP 
includes specific provisions on state-owned enterprises, the same is not the case in TTIP as the role of 
state enterprises in the EU and US are less important. Sixth, while TPP has a separate chapter on trade 
remedies including anti-dumping measures, countervailing measures and safeguards, the TTIP does not. 
Seventh, TPP has separate chapters on co-operation and capacity building for the lesser developed TPP 
countries, on transparency and anti-corruption, competitiveness, and administrative and institutional 
provisions. These issues are not covered in TTIP as they are considered of less important for the EU and 
 
21 See website http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc_153955.pdf.  
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US. Finally, on November 12, 2015 the European Commission finalised its approach on investment 
protection and investment dispute resolution for TTIP. The proposal submitted to the US aims to 
safeguard the EU and its Members' right to regulate, while providing effective protection to EU 
companies through a transparent system for resolving investment disputes with publicly appointed 
judges, highest ethical standards and possibility to have errors corrected through an appeal instance. On 
the other hand, TPP considers the role of investor protection through investor-to-state dispute 
settlement (ISDS) approach via international arbitration. 
In the case of KOREU, although less ambitious than TTIP, it is still a very advanced FTA covering most of 
the chapters of TTIP. It has sectoral annexes on electronics, motor vehicles and parts, pharmaceutical 
products and medical devices, and chemicals dealing with non-tariff barriers in those sectors. Similarly, 
when considering the liberalisation of services KOREU uses the positive list approach22 for opening 
Korean services and has sector specific sub-sections on computer services, postal and courier services, 
and international maritime transport services. Furthermore, KOREU in contrast to TTIP does not have an 
investment chapter nor investor-state dispute settlement provisions. On the other hand, EU-Canada 
CETA is a deep and comprehensive FTA covering almost all of the chapters of TTIP. It has a sectoral annex 
on motor vehicles dealing with non-tariff barriers. EU-Canada- CETA uses the negative list approach to 
opening of services with reservations listed in two annexes. In addition, EU-Canada- CETA has sector 
specific subsections on computer services, postal and courier services, and international maritime 
transport services. Furthermore, EU-Canada- CETA has a very extensive chapter on promoting and 
protecting investment incorporating the new structure of an investment court system as a complement 
to private-to-state dispute settlement and government-to-government dispute settlement. Finally, note 
that the EU-Ukraine DCFTA is also a deep and comprehensive agreement covering most of the issues 
covered by TTIP and TPP. 
There have been several attempts to quantify the effects of TTIP and TPP. Two of the latest studies on the 
impact of TTIP are Egger et al. (2015) and Felbermayr et al. (2015). Their results differ considerably. While 
according to Egger et al. (2015) estimated gains in real income range between 1 % and 2.25 % for the US 
and the EU respectively, the estimated gains according to Felbermayr et al. (2015) amount to 3.9 % of the 
EU GDP for the EU and 4.9 % of the US GDP for the US. On the other hand, the effects of TPP have been 
analysed among others by Petri et al. (2011) and Kawasaki (2015). While according to Petri (2011) 
estimated gains in real income for the US amount to 0.19 % of US GDP, Kawasaki (2015) shows that US 
benefit would amount to 0.8 % of US GDP. 
3.2 Updating the EU-Turkey trade and investment relations 
Table 4 highlights a key narrative of this paper, which is that the EU-Turkey CU does not cover most of the 
chapters included in TTIP such as agriculture, services, government procurement, SPS measures, 
regulatory coherence, sustainable development, small and medium sized enterprises, investment 
protection, and dispute settlement. Similar considerations apply in the cases of TPP, KOREU, and CETA. 
 
 
22 A positive list approach is one where parties to an agreement specify which sectors are covered. A negative list approach, by 
contrast, requires that parties specify the sectors that are not covered by commitments. The GATS uses a positive list approach to 
identify sectoral coverage and then a negative list approach to indicate limitations to market access and national treatment 
commitments in respect of sectors listed in schedules.  
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Table 4 Comparison of TTIP, EU-Turkey CU, and World Bank Study on Modernisation of CU 
 TTIP EU-Turkey Customs Union World Bank study on 
Modernisation of the EU-








          
Trade in Goods and Customs 
Duties(*) 
Free Movement of Industrial 
Commodities 
- 
- - Agriculture 
Services - Services Trade 
Public Procurement - Public Procurement 







      
Regulatory Coherence - - 
Technical Barriers to Trade Elimination of Technical 
Barriers to Trade 
- 
Food Safety and Animal and Plant 
Health  
- - 
TBTs and SPS in Specific Industries - - 
Chemicals - - 
Cosmetics - - 
Engineering - - 
Medical Devices - - 
Pesticides - - 
Information and Communication (ICT) - - 
Pharmaceuticals - - 
Textiles - - 
Vehicles - - 




             
Sustainable Development - - 
Labour - - 
Environment - - 
Energy and Raw Materials - - 
Customs and Trade Facilitation Customs Provisions - 
Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises 
- - 
Investment Protection - - 
Competition Competition Rules - 
Intellectual Property and 
Geographical Indicators 
Protection of Intellectual, 
Industrial and Commercial 
Property 
- 
Dispute Settlement - - 




- Trade Defence Instruments - 
(*) Note that TTIP under 'Trade in Goods and Customs Duties' covers both agricultural and industrial goods. 
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Turkey, a net debtor to the rest of the world, has been facing problems with the sustainability of its 
current account. During 2014 the current account deficit had decreased from 9.7 % in 2011 and 7.9 % in 
2013 to 5.8 % of its GDP, and its external debt-to-GDP ratio according to International Investment 
Position data has amounted to 55.2 %. To achieve sustainability of current account, Turkey has to 
increase its exports considerably over time, and also increase the FDI inflows into Turkey, which are much 
more stable than portfolio investment inflows. Once TTIP is implemented Turkey will seek to adjust to 
TTIP rules on trade and investment as otherwise it will have difficulty in increasing its exports to the 
lucrative US and EU markets and attracting the FDI inflows. According to Egger et al. (2015) and 
Felbermayr et al. (2015) Turkey, if it would not adopt and implement the TTIP rules, could suffer welfare 
losses amounting to 0.75 % and 1.56 % of Turkish GDP, respectively. The above considerations reveal that 
the trade and investment relations between the EU and Turkey are in need of a major up-dating. 
Recently the World Bank, commissioned by the European Commission, prepared the report 'Evaluation of 
the EU-Turkey CU'. In that report, the World Bank concluded that opportunities for widening Turkey's 
trade relationship with the EU should concentrate on the liberalisation of agriculture, services trade, and 
public procurement. In addition it is emphasised that a solution should be found to current visa 
restrictions. The next section briefly considers what the liberalisation of agriculture, services and 
government procurement would entail for Turkey. 
3.2.1 Agriculture 
In agriculture, the real challenge for Turkey is to achieve free movement of agricultural products between 
the EU and Turkey. Full compliance with the acquis will require that Turkey adjusts its policy on the one 
hand in such a way as to adopt the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) measures, and on the other hand 
adopts and implements EU rules on SPS issues. In the EU, the acquis on agriculture covers a large number 
of binding rules. The latest CAP reforms, approved by the European Council in December 2013, set out 
the new rules for the CAP in the next seven-year period until 2020. They are designed to equip the 
European agricultural sector for the opportunities and challenges of the future. The main objectives of 
the reforms are to make the CAP greener and more targeted. They seek to effect a more equitable 
distribution of income support to farmers across the EU Member States, along with a more effective rural 
development policy.  
The available data indicates that EU would benefit from an agreement on agriculture, either through an 
FTA or by extending the CU (see section 3.5) Turkey’s applied MFN tariffs on imports of agricultural goods 
are typically high so liberalising bilateral trade and adoption of the EU’s common external tariff for 
agriculture would imply a significant fall in import protection for certain products. According to the WTO 
statistics, Turkey’s agricultural import tariffs averaged 41.7 percent in 2011 compared to an average of 
13.9 percent for the EU. Turkey has one of the highest rates of agricultural import protection among 
OECD countries. All of Turkey’s agricultural tariffs are bound, albeit at high rates. Turkey also maintains a 
statutory tariff, which can be used to increase applied tariff rates by 150 percent when deemed necessary 
although overall rates cannot exceed those bound under the WTO. Turkey is entitled to use export 
subsidies to support trade in a number of its agricultural products, including exports of these to the EU, 
with WTO commitments allowing export subsidies on 44 product groups. There have been EU complaints 
over subsidised Turkish exports of flour.    
As Figure 3 highlights, tariffs are especially high for imports of processed meat and live animals, some 
dairy products (e.g. buttermilk and cream) and tea. Tariffs on products such as wheat, rice and red meat 
are also adjusted temporarily to ensure domestic production is consumed first (World Bank 2014). 
 
 






Services cover a broad range of markets, encompassing network industries such as electricity, natural gas, 
and communications; other intermediate services such as transport, financial intermediation, 
distribution, construction, and business services; and services destined for final consumption such as 
tourism and travel, recreation, education, health, and environmental services. Barriers to trade in services, 
which are typically regulatory in nature, lead to inefficiencies in service sectors and to high costs of 
services. Since the productivity and competitiveness of goods and services firms depend largely on 
access to low cost and high-quality producer services such as transportation, distribution, 
telecommunications and finance, and since they have powerful influence on economic growth, it is of 
utmost importance to increase the efficiency of service industries which in turn can be achieved through 
liberalisation of trade in different service sectors. As in the case of agriculture the challenge for Turkey is 
to achieve free trade of services between the EU and Turkey. But this will require that Turkey adopts and 
implements for each of the service sectors it intends to liberalise the regulatory framework of the EU. 
In the EU services can be classified under three headings: (i) services where EU wide regulations apply 
such as financial services, telecommunication services, energy services, and transportation services; (ii) 
services regulated by Services Directive 200/123/EC such as legal services, accounting services, business 
related services, and construction services; and (iii) services regulated by national regulations such as 
public services including health services, education services, and social services. A future deep 
integration trade agreement covering liberalisation of services between the EU and Turkey will most 
probably include services in the first group and some of the services in the second group, but will exclude 
services regulated nationally. Both the EU and Turkey are among the 23 negotiating parties to the Trade 
in Services Agreement (TiSA), that together account for 70 % of world trade in services.  
From the EU perspective, services are a significant element of both the global and internal EU economy.  
The EU is the world's largest exporter of services, which translates into employment for millions 
throughout Europe in the services sector. Clearly then, for the EU, opening up markets for services will 
mean more growth and more jobs. The EU’s initial offer and negotiating proposals are all publically 
available and could form the basis for a EU-Turkey services chapter in an FTA that extends beyond the 
GATS, to fully incorporate financial services and Mode 4 issues. For example, the EU's TiSA proposal 
includes a suggestion to incorporate procedural commitments on the Mode 4 temporary entry and stay 
of highly skilled professionals on the basis of a separate protocol. This indicates a shift in EU strategy, for 
traditionally the EU has not taken procedural commitments related to mode 4 in trade agreements. 
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However, given the more recent offensive interests of the EU in mode 4 and the importance of 
procedural commitments for that purpose, the EU has sought to give further impetus to the negotiations 
by proposing this complementary protocol as an integral element of the TiSA Agreement.23 
3.2.3 Investment 
In the area of investment, the EU strategy is to ensure a level playing field of high quality to all investors. 
Article 63 TFEU prohibits all restrictions on the movement of capital and payments between the EU 
Member States. The functioning of the internal market is based on the fundamental notion of non-
discrimination and the understanding that restrictions and exceptions to the free movement of capital 
should be limited as much as possible. However, in the EU, rather than negotiating EU level investment 
agreements, FDI agreements until recently were concluded bilaterally by individual Member States 
through Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), the aim of which has been and still is to promote 
investments by guaranteeing, inter alia, non-discriminatory treatment of investors from either party by 
guaranteeing most-favoured nation (MFN) treatment, fair and equitable treatment, free transfer of capital 
without restrictions, and compensation in case of unjustified expropriation. After entering into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 the EU according to Article 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of European 
Union (TFEU) has exclusive common commercial policy competence on FDI. Thus, FDI is now part of EU's 
common commercial policy, and EU Commission may legislate on FDI although the individual BITs of 
Member States will be preserved until they will be replaced by EU wide investment deals.  
The EU’s investment strategy is based on the belief that investment is essential. On the one hand, 
outward investment helps European companies improve their competitiveness; while on the other hand 
inward investment is responsible for employing 7.3 million people in the EU. Investment in both 
directions is a key part of the infrastructure that connects the European economy to global value chains. 
The EU’s ‘Investment plan for Europe’ seeks to boost investment, which in 2014 was 15 % down on pre-
crisis levels. A key tool to promote investment is through international agreements. This will also assist 
the EU’s strategy to liberalise trade in services. This is because facilitating trade in services also requires 
openness to foreign direct investment. Over 60 % of EU direct investment abroad is connected to trade in 
services. International trade in services requires companies to establish in markets abroad to deliver 
services to new local customers. WTO estimates indicate that two thirds of services are delivered through 
establishment. Investing around the world also allows service companies to offer global solutions to 
customers at home, supporting the connections of EU manufacturing and service companies to global 
value chains (EU Trade for All Strategy 2015). The EU investment strategy also includes sustainable 
development objectives. It seeks to engage with partners to promote human rights, labour rights and 
environmental, health and consumer protection, support development and control corruption. The 
objective is for key policies for the future of Europe’s integration into the world economy, like investment 
and regulatory cooperation, to support these broader sustainable development objectives and ensure 
that any changes to levels of social, labour or environmental protection are upward.  
An EU-Turkey deep integration RTA with an investment chapter could therefore serve the EU’s overall 
investment strategy and as well as Turkey. Both parties are interested in securing for their investors 
protection against discrimination in terms of most-favoured-nation treatment and national treatment. 
Both parties desire protection against expropriation of their investors’ assets, if these expropriations are 
not for public policy purpose and not fairly compensated, as well as fair and equitable treatment and the 
right to transfer capital – for these are also basic requirements of the more recent investment treaties. In 
addition, performance requirements and other sustainable development and public policy safeguard 
provisions could be included to ensure that the liberalisation of investment between the EU and Turkey 
 
23 http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1133  
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does not lead to a relaxing of labour or environmental standards to attract more investment, or that 
fundamental domestic policy objectives are undermined. 
Attractive models already exist in the EU-Canada CETA discussed above, or the TPP Agreement 
Investment Chapter. This includes a set of core obligations such as (i) providing for national treatment 
and most favoured nation treatment, (ii) providing minimum standard of treatment for investments 
including protections against denial of justice and failure to provide police protection, (iii) ensuring that if 
a TPP government expropriates an investment, it does so for a public purpose, in accordance with due 
process of law, and subject to prompt, adequate and fully realisable and transferable compensation, (iv) 
allowing for transfer of funds related to an investment covered under the Agreement, (v) barring 
specified performance requirements, including local content requirements, export requirements, and 
technology transfer or technology localisation requirements, and (vi) ensuring investors have the ability 
to appoint senior managers without regard to nationality, and ensuring that any nationality-based 
restrictions on the appointment of board members do not impair an investor’s control over its 
investment. The TPP countries have agreed to accept these obligations on a negative-list basis. 
3.2.4 Public procurement 
Tendering for public contracts is about how public authorities spend taxpayers’ money when buying 
goods, services or works. Currently, Turkish companies face obstacles in winning public contracts in the 
EU and EU companies face obstacles in winning public contracts in Turkey due to the widespread use of 
domestic content requirements, particularly in high tech procurements. Moreover, while the Turkish the 
Public Procurement Law (4734) sets out principles and requirements to ensure a transparent and fair 
tendering process, as well as provisions to control corruption and probity, enforcement records are poor. 
Procurement practices have been criticised for becoming less transparent, with amendments to 
procurement law placing tenders in sectors such as defence, security, intelligence, technology, and 
railways outside of the purview of the monitoring watchdog Public Procurement Authority (KİK). 
Moreover, judicial reforms in 2012 reduced criminal charges for bid-rigging in public tenders (Freedom 
House 2014:12).  Further market opening based on the principles of transparency, non-discrimination 
and procedural fairness would be good for both the EU and Turkey. For public authorities with tight 
budgets it can bring (i) better money for value, (ii) more choice, (iii) greater economic efficiency and (iv) 
good governance. If parties could agree on rules which will ensure that they are not discriminated 
against in public procurements, agree on rules to maximise transparency in tendering for public 
contracts, and maximise the opportunities for firms of both parties to participate in tenders at all 
government levels, both parties would win. 
The EU’s established RTA procurement chapters are fully in line with the WTO Government Procurement 
Agreement (WTO GPA) as regards the rules governing procurement procedures, transparency, eligibility, 
administration and domestic remedies. The plurilateral WTO GPA provides a limited number of 45 parties 
with a framework for ensuring that the procurement covered under the Appendix to the chapter is 
conducted in a competitive non-discriminatory and transparent manner. It includes tender procedures, 
performance requirements, the prohibition of offsets, transitionary measures, public policy exceptions 
and a requirement for a bid review mechanism at the domestic level, to provide redress to disappointed 
bidders, and an opportunity to bring the complaint to the State level through notification to the 
implementation body (Dawar and Evenett, 2011). The TPP Procurement Chapter 15 is fully 
comprehensive and it is based on the WTO Government Procurement Agreement legal framework.  The 
EU is an active party to the WTO GPA. It is therefore most likely that the commitments will either conform 
to the WTO GPA or include further concessions in certain areas of coverage, and could therefore be 
considered a WTO GPA+ RTA. An EU-Turkey procurement chapter could usefully include more detailed 
wording on electronic procurement websites which conform to intra-EU arrangements, and it could also 
seek to prevent corruption in procurement tenders, as with the 2014 WTO GPA. This would be of further 
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benefit in opening up the de facto access of smaller firms to procurement markets in both the EU and 
Turkey. The market access coverage of the procurement chapter could also be tailored to ensure that 
Turkey is able to gain transitionary measures where necessary to open up procurement markets on a 
more incremental basis, until they reach a level comparable with the EU. For example, Turkey may be 
given transitional timeframe for implementing the provisions prohibiting certain local content 
requirements, supported by capacity building measures. 
A comprehensive procurement chapter would provide Turkey a framework from which to accede to the 
WTO Government Procurement Agreement, which could be considered the ultimate goal for Turkey and 
the EU. It would also shelter Turkish firms from EU instruments such as the proposed International 
Procurement Instrument (IPI).24 The IPI as currently proposed, lays down procedures for contracting 
authorities to reject tenders or contracts of an estimated value of EUR5 million or above and consisting of 
more than 50 % of goods or services, which are not subject to the EU's international procurement 
commitments in the WTO GPA or its RTAs. This instrument provides the EU with a unilateral tool to 
increase leverage when negotiating access to public procurement markets of other trading partners, not 
currently party to the WTO GPA or its RTAs, such as Turkey. However, from the EU perspective, 
liberalisation of procurement markets is more transparent and better achieved through negotiating a 
comprehensive chapter with deep concessions. 
In sum: it will be quite a challenge for Turkey to achieve free movement of agricultural commodities 
between the EU and Turkey since the rules of EU acquis on agriculture and food safety, veterinary and 
phytosanitary policy are quite different from those prevailing in Turkey. It will be a further challenge for 
the country to achieve the liberalisation of services since the rules of the EU acquis on services and public 
procurement are again quite different from those prevailing in Turkey. Given the protection that 
domestic firms receive on domestic procurement markets, it would also be a challenge for Turkey to 
accede to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement for example, But, the liberalisation of 
agriculture, services, investment and public procurement, while costly, is a must for Turkey if it wants to 
stay competitive in the world economy, and increase its exports and FDI inflows. Similar considerations 
apply to investment and dispute settlement issues. For the EU, the benefits of extending the level playing 
field for EU trade and investment are conclusive. The EU Trade for All Strategy is based on the 
understanding that trade has never been more important for the EU economy and this became clear with 
the onset of the 2008 financial crisis. International trade and investment is crucial when EU domestic 
demand is weak. The projections suggest that by 2030 around 90 % of global economic growth will be 
generated outside Europe. Currently, more than 30 million jobs are supported by exports outside the EU, 
which is two thirds more than 15 years ago and as a result, exports now support almost one in seven jobs 
in Europe.  
3.3 Choices facing Turkey 
The above considerations reveal that the present EU-Turkey CU could be modified to take into account 
the various criticisms of the CU summarised in section 1.3, and liberalisation of agriculture could be 
achieved by extending the present CU to agriculture. On the other hand, liberalisation of services and 
public procurement could be achieved by signing a separate FTA with the EU covering those sectors. 
Alternatively, the present EU-Turkey CU could be modified to take into account the various criticisms of 
the CU summarised in section 1.3, and a separate FTA with the EU could be signed covering agriculture, 
 
24 Amended proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the access of third-country goods and 
services to the Union’s internal market in public procurement and procedures supporting negotiations on access of Union goods 
and services to the public procurement markets of third countries. Brussels, 29.1.2016 COM(2016) 34 final. (henceforth: the IPI 
Proposal). 
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services and public procurement. In addition to the areas covered by the World Bank (2014), it is our 
strong belief that a deep integration agreement between the EU and Turkey should also cover issues 
related with investment and dispute settlement. 
According to United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2015) the average FDI inflow into 
Turkey during the last three years amounted to USD12.6 billion, average outflow USD4.8 billion, the FDI 
inward stock during 2014 USD168.6 billion, and FDI outward stock USD40.1 billion. On the other hand, 
the average FDI inflow into the EU during the last three years amounted to USD318.5 billion, average 
outflow USD294 billion, the FDI inward stock during 2014 USD9.2 trillion, and FDI outward stock USD10.4 
trillion. Since FDI is increasing competition and boosting trade, it will optimise resource allocation in the 
economy, create jobs, and transfer technology and skills. Hence, FDI is very important for both the EU and 
Turkey. Following the TTIP negotiations, the final text on investment will be incorporated into the TTIP 
and Turkey will be forced to adjust its investment system to the new rules. Therefore, it would be 
expedient for both parties to use the TTIP investment chapter as the basis for negotiating concessions. 
At the Workshop on 'Bringing EU-Turkey Trade and Investment Relations up to Date' held at European 
Parliament in Brussels on March 17, 2016 Mr. Murat Yapıcı, Director General for EU Affairs at the Ministry 
of Economy of Turkey emphasised that Turkey is considering the various options for the liberalisation of 
services but would be reluctant to liberalise agriculture and public procurement. On the other hand, 
during the Workshop Mr. Ignacio Garcia Bercero (Director of the European Commission’s Directorate 
General for Trade), pointed out that the EU Commission is interested in the liberalisation of not only 
services, but also in the liberalisation of agriculture and public procurement. 
3.4 Choices facing the EU 
Strengthening the global role of the EU is among the ten priorities of the European Commission for the 
2014-19 period. In addition to upgrading trade relations with countries such as Mexico and Chile, these 
priorities state that the EU’s trade relations with Turkey require an overhaul. Alongside modernising trade 
and investment relations, the increase in the strategic importance of EU-Turkey relations is significant, 
due to changes in international and regional relations related to the Middle East and the refugee crisis. 
The EU needs to act jointly with Turkey. This cooperation requires a foreign policy vision that embraces 
enlargement negotiations and a progressive neighbourhood policy. Turkey and the EU share mutual 
benefits in foreign policy security, border management, and migration policies. 
Turkey is important to the EU’s political as well as economic wellbeing. The EU is striving to maintain its 
competitiveness and recover fully from the impact of the 2008 fiscal crisis. It is therefore significant that 
the available evidence from the EU Member States indicates that a 1 % increase in the openness of the 
economy results in a 0.6 % rise in labour productivity the following year. The EU Union has more to lose 
than gain from protectionist measures, since it is dependent on many imported products. Raising their 
cost would reduce the EU’s competitiveness inside and outside the Union leading directly to a loss of 
European production and jobs. A 10 % rise in trade restrictions could lead to a 4 % loss in national 
income. (European Commission, 2014) 
The existing quantitative research suggests25 that European companies support the widening the scope 
of the existing customs union and that any new agreement should include capacity building on how to 
exploit trade and investment opportunities for European companies in Turkey. Further, for European 
businesses, improving the sustainable development dimension of the business environment in Turkey in 
terms of raising labour and environmental standards, is as important as actively promoting the Turkish 
 
25 EU-Turkey Relations: Perspectives from the European Business Community Eurochambres and TOBB – 2013. See website 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc_153955.pdf. 
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market in Europe. (Eurochambers 2013).  European companies state that the CU should be improved and 
extended to new areas, such as services, investment, agricultural products as well as consumer protection 
and food safety. This would improve the regulatory environment in Turkey, and generate new business 
opportunities. The majority of European companies (82 %) operating or investing in Turkey consider that 
important barriers to trade and investment remain. These surveys suggest that existing progressive 
alignment of Turkish legislation to the EU acquis is considered to have already positively changed the 
business environment since 1995 but that more needs to be done. In sum, while Turkey is already well 
advanced in implementing several essential legislative and administrative reforms in relevant areas, the 
legal and institutional situation in Turkey, and its level of overall cooperation with the EU remain lower 
than necessary.  
The EU would gain significantly in the areas of investment, procurement, services and agriculture as well 
as the further internationalisation of its regulatory frameworks and norms, from deeper integration with 
Turkey. It would extend EU principles of sustainable development through provisions covering trade and 
labour, trade and environment, as well as transparency, good governance and corruption control. 
3.5 Identifying options 
Having examined the general and specific issues involved in updating EU-Turkey trade and investment 
relations to meet the needs and expectations of both parties in the 21st century, this section identifies the 
available policy options. Of the five options discussed below, the first two are considered to be non-
options - doing nothing, and full accession. Nevertheless, they are briefly included in order to put forward 
the full spectrum of possible choices for analysis. 
3.5.1 Baseline scenario: Do nothing 
While this option has the advantage of requiring no further resources, legal instrument or legislative 
mobilisation, for all the reasons discussed in this report, this option is not considered further. Without 
adapting or modernising EU-Turkey commercial relations, the opportunities identified above, relating to 
exploiting the governance and economic benefits of liberalising procurement, services and agricultural 
markets will be lost. Moreover, the weaknesses and challenges arising from the status quo will persist, 
such as the lack of sustainable development provisions in EU-Turkey trade relations, lack of value for 
money and transparency in procurement markets, from the legal perspective the problems involved in 
requiring a ‘Turkey Clause” in EU RTAs, and the lack of rules based framework for settling disputes under 
the existing Customs Union. Taken together these flaws risk creating greater issues of economic 
irrelevance, political illegitimacy and ultimately inapplicability, while forgoing the potential economic 
and diplomatic benefits of deeper integration between the EU and Turkey. 
3.5.2 Turkey gains full EU Membership 
The legal avenue for enlarging the EU to incorporate Turkey entails Turkey complying fully with the 
acquis. This would entail a continuation of Turkey accession process. Indeed, unless new initiatives are 
established, this option could de facto result in the base scenario option of doing nothing. 
Turkey applied for full membership in 1987, was confirmed as candidate in December 1999 and 
negotiations started in October 2005 when Turkey had met the conditions for accession talks extending 
the CU with the EU to all new Member States, including Cyprus. However, after failing to open up its ports 
and airports to Cypriot traffic, the EU responded by freezing accession talks in eight policy areas in 2008. 
Subsequently Cyprus and France blocked further chapters. 
The new “positive agenda” initiated in May 2012 began with the EU and Turkey identifying areas for 
expanding co-operation, but then stalled when Cyprus took up the EU's six-month rotating presidency in 
July 2012 and communications between Turkey and the Cyprus authorities broke down. As a result of 
these protracted delays, only 13 of Turkey's 35 negotiating chapters were opened, and only one closed. 
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The opening of Chapter 17 on Economic and Monetary Policy  in the EU 's m em bership talks in 2015 
marked the first formal discussions since 2013 and what many see as a fresh start for EU-Turkey ties after 
years of uneasy relations. Underlying that change is Turkey's promise to help stem the flow of migrants to 
Europe in return for cash, visas and renewed talks on joining the EU, to which Ankara formally started its 
membership talks a year ago. 
While full accession would remove the external legal constraints on Turkey participating in EU external 
trade relations and allow the full potential of integration to be realised. It is both technically and 
politically unlikely in the short term, and moreover, Turkey would still need to be in compliance with the 
acquis before this could happen. 
3.5.3 Modernise the current CU 
This option would require amendment of Decision 1/95. It would allow for enhancing bilateral trade 
relations while providing for improved implementation and dispute settlement mechanism. It could 
potentially also address agriculture. An enhanced CU expected to increase FDI-flows from the EU, in 
addition to expanding trade into a diversified range of sectors, is likely to offer an effective remedy to the 
“middle income trap.”  
The negative aspect of this side is that Turkey remains locked out of EU-third party negotiations, with 
repercussions of tariff preference erosion, and democratic deficit in decision making for Turkey. 
Moreover, it would omit various other deep integration issues such as services, investment and 
procurement are required to modernise EU-Turkey economic relations. 
3.5.4 Complement the current CU with a new comprehensive FTA 
An extended CU could incorporate agriculture, while being accompanied by negotiating a 
complementary deep integration RTA covering services, government procurement, investment, dispute 
settlement. The RTA could also extend the rules on TBTs, IPR and competition present in the EU-Turkey 
CU, if they were not handled under the modernisation of the CU. 
The negative aspect of this side is again that Turkey remains locked out of EU-third party negotiations, 
with repercussions of tariff preference erosion, and democratic deficit in decision making for Turkey. 
Moreover, it does not result in a unified comprehensive set of rules covering trade in goods, services and 
investment, and the inter-linkages between these markets. 
3.5.5 EEA Membership 
A halfway house is for Turkey to join the EEA.26 Advocates for this position argue that adopting the EEA 
agreement would not require conforming to the acquis, but would still allow Turkey and the EU to 
engage in freer trade. EEA membership would therefore facilitate commerce on the one hand, and 
provide Turkey with social and political benefits such as reduced visa requirements, while increasing 
social and environmental standards on the other hand. Article 20 EEA addressing the free movement of 
persons stipulates that its provisions are subject to member agreement, which would address concerns 
about providing Turkey with full residency rights in Europe.  
The EEA option would extend the geographical scope of the Internal Market and its flanking policies to 
Turkey. Membership of the EEA would also provide decision-shaping, continuous take-over of new EU 
legislation on the internal market with the EFTA court presiding over it. This is a ‘privileged partnership’ 
 
26 Agreement on the European Economic Area - Final Act - Joint Declarations - Declarations by the Governments of the Member 
States of the Community and the EFTA States - Arrangements - Agreed Minutes - Declarations by one or several of the 
Contracting Parties of the Agreement on the European Economic Area, OJ L1, 3.1.1994, pp. 3-522.  
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and can be fully integrated with pre-accession. This would provide less pressure on political issues such 
as improving Turkey’s relationship with Cyprus, while providing the benefits of integration in the internal 
market. Joining the EEA extend the customs union between the EU and Turkey by ensuring a very deep 
and wide internal market, with the exception of agriculture and fisheries. It would combine deeper 
economic integration with common institutions for surveillance and adjudication of infringements, when 
they arise. 
The disadvantage with this option is that this option would result in a permanent waiting room for 
Turkey because striving for EU membership is the not the premise of the EEA. Moreover, the EEA is an FTA 
and therefore if Turkey joined it would preclude Turkey’s participation in the EU customs union or in the 
Common Commercial Policy. This is because it would provide deeper economic integration with the EU 
than enjoyed by current EEA countries. However, this option could be perceived as backtracking on 
accession-oriented aspects of CU, either as a EEA Membership is seen as a waiting room until full EU 
accession, following the examples of Austria, Finland and Sweden, or as a permanent solution, following 
Norway and Liechtenstein.  
3.5.6 Replace the current CU with a new comprehensive FTA 
This option involves negotiating a completely new agreement along the lines of the more recent deep 
integration RTAs that the EU has negotiated with Canada, Korea or in the future TTIP, discussed above. 
Thus, it would result in a comprehensive agreement with chapters covering industrial goods, agriculture, 
services, TBT, IPR, investment, competition and public procurement and enforced through dispute 
settlement provision.  
This option would require substantial adaptations to the Association Agreement because it represents a 
major shift in EU-Turkey contractual relations. Approval would have to be granted either through a new 
Decision of the Association Council or through a new Protocol to the Association Agreement, which 
would require a full treaty-making procedure, pursuant to TFEU Articles 217 and 218. This choice has the 
advantages of incorporating the necessary new issues that would modernise the agreement and bring it 
in line with more contemporary developments in regional agreements. If a comprehensive RTA replaced 
the CU, it would remove the difficulty of Turkey’s exclusion from EU Trade external relations negotiations. 
However, as with the option of EEA Membership, completely replacing the CU with a deep integration 
RTA could be perceived as backtracking on progress made to date on the accession-oriented aspects of 
CU. It might also incur increased transaction costs linked to rules of origin. 
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4 Conclusions and recommendations  
This paper maintains that the EU-Turkey Customs Union of 1995, limited to industrial goods, should be 
modernised and modified to take into account the various and growing criticisms of the CU. A 
consideration of the various areas of modernisation and the different options available suggests that 
further economic integration between the EU and Turkey should be directed towards signing a 
complementary deep integration RTA between the EU and Turkey covering agriculture, SPS measures, 
services, government procurement, investment, and dispute settlement. Such an approach should 
increase competition and lead to better allocation of resources in both Turkey and the EU. Despite raising 
doubts about full accession in the short run, there is nevertheless absolutely no evidence that either 
Turkey or the EU and its Member States wants to unilaterally break with Turkey’s accession process. This 
is because of the various interdependencies, as well as the high potentials of their partnership in terms of 
politics and security, economy, trade and energy, as well as socio-cultural relations. 
The EU continues to face various internal and external challenges. Internal fissures are appearing caused 
by growing inequality and the difficulties in post-crisis recovery of the Euro zone. There is an urgent need 
to identify new sources of growth and employment. Private investment in innovation is falling short of 
the target, while there is a growing brain drain mostly from regions worst affected during the crisis and 
the subsequent austerity measures. Externally, the Union’s neighbourhood has become an area of high 
risk with an increasing number of open conflicts challenging Europe's security. They pose immediate 
threats to Europe’s security and trigger asylum seeking immigration that puts pressure on EU external 
borders and relevant policies from migration to humanitarian assistance and development cooperation. 
Deepening EU-Turkey integration would offer significant gains for the EU as well as for Turkey. Signing a 
deep integration RTA should increase market access through eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers to 
the EU market, and will facilitate the fulfilment of the requirements of TTIP. These are considerable 
advantages for Turkey. Turkey understands the growing importance of global value chains trade, and 
how concluding deep and comprehensive FTAs such as TPP, KOREU or EU-Canada CETA would 
potentially allow them to grow economically. This process would also allow them to realise further 
achievements in the TTIP negotiations. The country is aware that the twenty-year old EU-Turkey CU no 
longer meets the requirements of the 21st century trade. It is consequently interested in up-dating the 
EU-Turkey trade and investment relations, but it is not sure how this up dating should take place. 
This suggests that the most tangible option is to complement the CU with a deep integration agreement 
to bring EU-Turkey trade and investment relations into line with current EU RTAs, such as the KOREU, EU-
Canada CETA, and the TTIP. The chapters of the TTIP will most probably contain stronger provisions than 
the EU-Turkey CU. Since under the TTIP negotiations it is likely that a harmonisation approach will be 
followed in some areas, while in other cases a mutual recognition or mutual equivalence approach. As 
such, meeting the requirements of the EU will make it easier for Turkey to fulfil the requirements of TTIP. 
In sum, for Turkey the challenge is to achieve liberalisation between the EU and Turkey. For the EU this is 
an opportunity to harness the economic and political potential of deeper integration with Turkey, 
through the further liberalisation of trade in goods, services, agriculture, and encouraging sustainable 
investment. 
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